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ABORTION TO AGING: PROBLEMS OF
DEFINITION IN THE MEDICAL
EXPENSE TAX DEDUCTIONt
ALAN

I.

L.

FELD*

INTRODUCTION

In 1976, expenditures for health care in the United States came to
almost $140 billion.' A substantial part of this cost was paid by direct
government aid, but most of it was paid from private sources. Some of the
people who paid their share of that expense enjoyed a mild comfort: they
could deduct part of their cost in computing their federal income tax.
Generally, a person who pays for health care can readily determine the
extent of this deduction. In a few instances, however, expenses incurred
by reason of medical need do not qualify for deduction; and in some
others, expenses incurred absent medical need may be covered by the
deduction. This article discusses the definitional problems in the deduction for medical care.
Under Internal Revenue Code section 213,2 a taxpayer may deduct
extraordinary medical expenses paid in the taxable year. The section itself
is relatively uncomplicated and its structure can be briefly outlined. The
provision measures the amount a taxpayer may deduct by aggregating all
expenses for medical care and subtracting three percent of adjusted gross
income (AGI). The taxpayer also may include expenses for drugs, after
first deducting an additional one percent of AGI. Medical expenses may
not be deducted if reimbursed by insurance, but medical insurance premiums themselves constitute a medical expense subject to a slightly different computation. The taxpayer may deduct half of his medical insurance
premiums in any year, up to $150, without regard to the usual three
percent of AGI floor; the balance is included as part of the medical
3
deduction computation.
t @ 1978 by Alan L. Feld.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Visiting Professor, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. A.B., Columbia College, 1960; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1963.
This article is based in part on research for a portion of a forthcoming treatise.
I Gibson & Mueller, National Health Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1976, Soc. Sec. Bull. 3, 4
(Apr. 1.977).
2 I.R.C. § 213. Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.
" President Carter recently proposed changes in the medical expense deduction. In a
message to Congress, he said:
I recommend substantial simplification of these [the medical and casualty expense]
provisions. The deductions for medical and casualty expenses will be combined, and a
new "extraordinary expense" deduction will be available for medical and casualty expenses in excess of 10 percent of adjusted gross income. In the case of casualty losses,
the excess over $100 will be included in this computation. Medical insurance premiums
and medicines will be treated the same as other medical expenses.
Medical and casualty expenditures should properly be deductible only when they are
unusually large and have a significant impact on the taxpayer's ability to pay. The
medical expense deduction originally met that standard. But, as a result of the chan n
relationship between medical costs and income, that standard is no longer satis 'ec
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The medical expense deduction entered the income tax scheme in 1942,
in the course of the transition of the federal income tax from essentially a
levy on the wealthy to a popular-based tax. The limited comment in the
committee report states that the deduction was designed to mitigate the
heavy burden of wartime taxation when income was used for health care
and to maintain a "high level of public health and morale." 4 In other
words, Congress found it inappropriate to tax at high rates income
applied by the taxpayer to medical expenses.
Some commentators see the medical expense deduction as an appropriate adjustment in determining the taxpayer's ability to pay income tax.5 In
this view, medical expenditures differ radically from a taxpayer's other
personal consumption choices and should not be taxed similarly:
What distinguishes medical expenses from other personal expenses
at bottom is a sense that large differences in their magnitude between
people in otherwise similar circumstances are apt to reflect differences in need rather than choices among gratifications.'
Others, however, criticize the medical expense deduction as a poorly
framed tax subsidy which, like any deduction or other tax expenditure, is
far more valuable to high-bracket than low-bracket taxpayers and carries
no benefit for those too poor to fall within the tax system.7 The revenue
cost of the deduction was estimated to be in excess of $2 billion in 1977.8
Under both views, questions of line drawing arise. We might suppose
that so fundamental a question as whether the deduction is regarded as
an adjustment to income reflecting actual ability to pay or as a subsidy
should affect resolution of definitional problems. But these divergences in
view are directed to the wisdom of including the deduction in the statute.
Once the legislative decision has been made, it becomes necessary under
Substantial recordkeeping burdens and administrative problems can be eliminated
through the proposed simplification of the deduction and the redefinition of "extraordinary" in the light of current experience among taxpayers.
President's Tax Message, Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 8 (special ed. No. 6 Jan. 23, 1978).
President Carter's tax proposals were introduced as the Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. 12078,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The proposed combined deduction for abnormal medical
expenses and casualty losses appears as section 221.
1 S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942). See also Sierk, The Medical-Expense
Deduction-Past, Present and Future, 17 Mercer L. Rev. 381, 382 (1966).
See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1972).
I at 336.
Id.
See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 720 (1970). In noting
the inequities inherent in a deduction as opposed to a direct subsidy, Professor Surrey
remarked:
What HEW Secretary would propose a medical assistance program for the aged that
cost $200 million, and under which $90 million would go to persons with incomes over
$50,000, and only $8 million to persons with incomes under $5,000? The tax proposal
to remove the 3% floor under the medical expense deductions of persons over 65 ITax
Reform Bill of 1969, H.R. 13,270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 914] would have had just that
effect.
Id. at 722.
8 Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Estimates of
Federal Tax Expenditures 9 (Comm. Print 1977).
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both views to reconcile the deduction with the general prohibition against
the deduction of personal expenditures. 9 All agree that it would be wrong
to extend the medical deduction to expenditures that enhance the taxpayer's well-being rather than restore it after a mishap. If the deduction
serves as a subsidy, the statute should be construed to address medical
emergencies, not personal frolics. If, on the other hand, the deduction is
viewed as an adjustment necessary to assess an individual's true incomethat amount available for consumption and accumulation-then the statute should be narrowly construed to cover only those expenditures dictated by medical need.
Administration of the medical expense deduction has generated its
share of litigation and rulings. The major areas of dispute center on two
questions. By far the more important question is how to distinguish
deductible medical expenses from other expenses that should be characterized as personal, living, or family expenses. The statutory definition of
medical care is a broad one, encompassing amounts paid for "diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose
of affecting any structure or function of the body."' 10 It also includes
transportation to obtain medical care." Because normal expenses of a
personal nature, such as nourishing food, fall literally within this language, an overbroad construction of the deduction would swallow up
many otherwise nondeductible living expenses. The need to distinguish
medical from personal expenses arises in two contexts. First, some expenditures provide a measure of medical improvement to the recipient but
also may be sought by other individuals in the ordinary course without
health care motives. Thus, the regulations have long provided that a
relaxing vacation, although beneficial for one's general well-being, is not
a deductible medical expense.' 2 Second, a taxpayer may pay for services
or procedures outside the ordinary course of medical treatment but which
provide little amusement, pleasure, or personal gratification as generally
understood. As to the latter payments, the Internal Revenue Service tends
to allow deductions liberally; it does not require the taxpayer to follow
orthodox medical procedure as a condition of deductibility.' 3 For example, acupuncture treatment is deductible even though the practice may
14
not be sanctioned by practitioner licensing or long prior usage.
A second issue is whose medical expenses a taxpayer may deduct. The
statute permits a taxpayer to deduct his own medical care expenses as well
as those of his spouse and dependents. Dependency is determined in
accordance with the rules for personal exemptions.' 5 Because the cost of
medical care easily can exceed the $750 deduction for an additional
9 See I.R.C. § 262.
10

I.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(A).

1.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(B).

12 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957).
13

See, e.g., text accompanying notes 135 & 136 infra.

14 Rev. Rul. 72-593, 1972-2 C.B. 180.
5 See I.R.C. § 152.
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exemption, the importance to the taxpayer of determining dependency
status may be far greater for this purpose than for personal exemptions.
A third issue-when to deduct an expenditure for medical care which
will benefit the taxpayer over several years-has not been a major source
of dispute. The regulations 16 depart from the usual capitalization rules
applicable to trade or business property. For the latter, deductions for
capital expenditures generally must be spread over the useful life of the
asset through depreciation rather than deducted at the time of expenditure. 7 Capital items purchased for health care, however, entitle the taxpayer to- a current deduction of the full amount of the expenditure,
reduced only by the enhancement in value to other property by reason of
the expenditure. The regulations use as an example a taxpayer who
installs an elevator in his home on the advice of a physician so that his
wife, who has heart disease, will not have to climb stairs.' If the installation cost is $1000, and the residence increases in value by $700, the
taxpayer may deduct the difference of $300 when the expenditure is
made. In following a current deduction rule, the regulations eliminate a
host of depreciation-related issues such as questions of useful life and
salvage value. In addition, they implicitly foreclose inquiry into whether
the taxpayer makes some nonmedical use of the improvement and obviate
the need to allocate between medical and other uses. The taxpayer is also
spared the recordkeeping necessary to keep track of the deductions over
time. Presumably, the initial requirements-that the capital expenditure
be directly related to medical care and that enhancement to other property be subtracted-are deemed under the regulations to provide adequate safeguards against abuse.
This paper explores the resolution of these definitional problems in a
number of factual settings, arranged in order of the individual's life
cycle. The problem of personal expenditures appears in each section,
dependency in sections II and VII, and capital expenditures in section VI.
II.

BIRTH

AND

PREVENTION

OF BIRTH

The proud parents of a newborn child may deduct the expenses related
to birth to the extent those expenses are not reimbursed by insuranceincluding doctor's bills and hospital expenses, as well as the cost of the
taxicab in the mad dash to the hospital. The determination of what is
medical care depends on the nature of ,the services rendered, not the title
or qualifications of the person rendering them. l ° Accordingly, women
who deliver their children at home, rather than in a hospital or other
Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii) (1974).
See I.R.C. §§ 263(a), 167(a). But see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-6, -12(a) (1960) (excepting
from the general rule tools and equipment of professionals and farmers if the equipment
has a short life).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(I)(iii) (1974).
19 See Rev. Rul. 70-170, 1970-1 C.B. 51, 52; C. Fink Fischer, 50 T.C. 164, 174 (1968),acq.
1969-2 C.B. xxiv.
IS
'7
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medical facility, may deduct expenses attributable to the birth, such as the
midwife's fee or rental of standby equipment. Postnatal medical costs,
including the expense of circumcision, similarly qualify for deduction as
amounts paid to affect a structure of the child's body, whether or not
performed by a physician.20 But the taxpayer may not deduct all the
expense associated with a new child. If a practical nurse assists with child
care and household chores in the first days after birth, the costs are
nondeductible personal expenses: these services promote the general
well-being of mother and child and do not constitute particular medical
treatment."1 Additionally, they serve as replacements for services normally performed by the mother or another member of the household.
Nor may the mother deduct the cost of maternity clothes or the child's
diaper service.2 2 Similar rules apply to prenatal examinations and
pre-pregnancy care; for example, the cost of treatment for sterility or of
artificial insemination is deductible, but not the cost of the legendary
pickles and ice cream. As noted earlier, the regulations distinguish
between deductible medical care, which is specific to a particular condition, and nondeductible care, which promotes the individual's general
well-being, in order to accommodate the general rule that bars deduction
of personal expenses. Unfortunately, good medical care as prescribed by a
physician does not follow so clear a line. By requiring specificity in medical treatment as a condition of deductibility, the Service disfavors certain
kinds of preventative care. General prenatal health of the mother, for
example, may correlate with a low incidence of birth defects; yet the costs
of maintaining that health are nondeductible in the usual case.
More controversial have been expenses incurred to prevent birth or
conception. Such expenses literally satisfy the statutory definition of medical care in that they affect a function of the body. But formerly they
often violated a provision of the regulations barring deduction of
amounts expended for illegal operations or treatments.23 Prior to the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, 24 most states prohibited elective abortions. Roe v. Wade invalidated such state criminal statutes
as they affect most abortions, and to that extent removed any barrier to
20 Hospital bills incurred for the newborn child are deductible even though the services
received, in a sense, may address only the child's general well-being. This exception to the
rule may be justified by a newborn child's extreme vulnerability.
'21 See Rev. Rul. 58-339, 1958-2 C.B. 106; cf. George B. Wendell, 12 T.C.
161 (1949)
(expense of hiring nurse for baby whose mother died in childbirth held not deductible). But
cf. George M. Womack, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1009 (1975) (total salary paid to nurse deductible
even though she also performed housework).
22 Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957). The regulation is phrased in terms of illegality
and does not itemize illegal operations or treatments. A similar provision bars expenses for
illegally procured drugs. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(2) (1957). These disallowances operate
administratively and have not been applied in any case or published ruling. Cf Rev. Rul.
63-91, 1963-1 C.B. 54 (no disallowance when illegality consists solely of practitioner's failure
to obtain a license).
24

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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their deductibility. 25 Abortions that remain illegal after Roe v. Wade continue to fall outside the scope of the deduction.
Some question may be raised as to whether a regulation imposing a
legality requirement should be regarded as surviving the 1969 Tax Reform Act. 26 Although the regulation and its history contain no explicit
authority for the legality provision, it apparently flowed from a judicially
developed doctrine denying deductions that are contrary to well-defined
state or federal public policies. 27 The doctrine, of indefinite contours,
created uncertainty, especially in the business deduction area. In response, Congress amended Code section 162 in the Tax Reform Act of
1969 by adding subsections (c), (f) and (g). These provisions prohibit
deduction under section 162 of certain expenditures deemed contrary to
public policy, such as bribes, or payments the deduction of which would
defeat a well-established public policy, such as the payment of fines. The
accompanying committee reports state that these provisions represent the
full extent of the illegality doctrine: Congress intended to call a stop to
judicial creativity in defining the parameters of public policy for deduction purposes. 28 Legislative history for the limited amendments added in
197129 echoes this view. 30 It appeared then that the general contrary-topublic-policy doctrine had been laid to rest; and presumably, the illegality
provision of section 213's regulations died with it. But this appearance was
only illusion. Recent cases and rulings have applied the doctrine in all its
ancient vitality under Code sections other than section 162.31 Congressional disapproval of the doctrine has thus been limited to ordinary
and necessary business expenses and certain related areas.
The Service's attitude toward expenses of contraception also reflects the
2- See Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140. This ruling, however, affirms that Treas. Reg. §
1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957) continues to bar deduction of expenses of an abortion performed
contrary to law. The same ruling approved deduction of the cost of legal vasectomies.
Revenue Ruling 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76, similarly approved deduction of amounts paid for
procedures such as tubal ligations to render women incapable of having children.
26 Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 710 (1969).
21 See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
28 S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274, reprinted in [1969] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2311 ("the provision for the denial of the deduction . . . is intended to be all
inclusive").
29 Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 310, 85 Stat. 525 (1971).
30 S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73, reprinted in [1971] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1980 ("the Committee continues to believe that the determination of when a deduction
should be denied should remain under the control of Congress").
31 See Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-17 I.R.B. 10 (taxpayer may not claim loss for seizure by
federal government of coin-operated gaming devices for nonpayment of tax under I.R.C. §
4461; to permit the loss would be contrary to an established public policy). See also Rev. Rul.
77-244, 1977-29 I.R.B. 8; Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors, 69 T.C. 36 (1977). The Tax Court
has taken a similar view under section 165. See Raymond Mazzei, 61 T.C. 497, 501-02 (1974).
Dictum in Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140, the post-Roe v. Wade abortion ruling, assumes
the continued vitality of the illegality regulation relating to -medical expense deductions.
The illegality provisions may affect expenses other than those of obtaining an abortion.
Suppose a physician prescribes smoking marijuana to mitigate his patient's glaucoma condition. Although the cost would be deductible if the taxpayer obtained the marijuana legally, is
the deduction lost upon an illegal purchase? The question has not yet been raised in
litigation.
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decriminalization of a birth control method.3 2 The Service's most recent
ruling approving deduction of the cost of contraceptive pills involved pills
prescribed by a physician. 33 Whether the ruling conditioned deductibility
on the fact that the pills were prescribed is unclear. If so, such a
requirement may be of doubtful validity, because prescriptions normally
34
are unnecessary to deduct the costs of drugs or medicines.
Birth control pills probably should be classified as drugs or medicines
for purposes of subjecting their cost to the extra one percent of AGI
floor. This separate treatment for drugs and medicines entered the statute in 1954. 3 ' The House report linked the one percent rule to a concern
that many taxpayers deducted amounts spent for "ordinary household
remedies, which do not represent extraordinary medical expense items," 38
while the Senate report spoke of amounts spent for "pharmaceuticals"
which in many cases "are not properly classified" as medical expense
items. 37 Although contraceptive pills do not easily fit either interdicted
class-they are neither ordinary household remedies nor pharmaceuticals
not properly classified as a medical expense-they do meet the common
understanding of drugs and medicines.
The statute does not define drugs and medicines, and little definitional
enlightenment has been forthcoming in regulations, rulings, or cases.
Regulations under section 213 describe drugs and medicines as items that
are "generally accepted" as such, expressly excluding only toiletries and
cosmetics. 3 8 Although contraceptive pills and foam appear to meet this
general acceptance test, other items serving the same purposediaphragms, condoms and intrauterine devices-do not and are therefore
not subject to the additional one percent statutory screen. Distinguishing
different birth control methods in this way seems arbitrary. The extra one
percent of AGI limitation makes sense as a solution to the problem
mentioned in the reports only as a rough de minimis criterion, filtering
out relatively small payments for consumables under a separate statutory
provision. Yet, if this limitation is intended to cut off deductions for small
amounts, it operates unfairly when the expenses are repeated and are of
39
the same magnitude as amounts paid for other medical care services.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'3 Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140. This ruling superseded Rev. Rul. 67-339, 1967-2
C.B. 126, which allowed a deduction for oral contraceptives when the possibility of childbirth
raised a serious threat to the life of the mother.
The cost of other contraceptive methods, if legally performed, also are deductible medical
expenses. Rev. Rul. 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76 (operation to prevent woman from having
children); Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (vasectomy).
34 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(2) (1957).
35 I.R.C. § 213(b).
36 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4017, 4055.
31 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4621, 4666.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(2) (1957).
39 President Carter's proposal to eliminate the separate one percent test presumably is
conditioned upon increasing the general AGI percentage. See note 3 supra.
31
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The expenses of adopting a child ordinarily are not deductible under
section 213.40 After adoption, the Code treats the adopted child as a child
by blood. 4 1 Thus, the child will be a dependent if his parents provide over
half of his support in that taxable year; 42 if so, medical expenses for the
child after the adoption are deductible as for any other dependent.
Problems may arise, however, when a child is adopted late in the year: if
the adoptive parents provide less than half the support for the year, the
support test will not be met and the child will not be a dependent in that
year. A related problem arises when medical expenses incurred prior to
the adoption are paid in the first instance by the adoption agency or some
other party and then reimbursed by the new parents. The Service allows
parents to deduct such expenses if the child is a dependent when the
expenses are paid; however, they may not deduct payments to reimburse
the agency for expenses incurred before negotiations for adoption began. 43 This may stretch notions of dependency a bit, particularly in light
of the need to establish the indicated chronology. Presumably, the agency's allocation of expenses as medical or nonmedical will be respected
when the amounts involved are reasonable. 44 Reimbursed medical expenses of the natural mother ordinarily are not deductible, even though
the unborn child's general health may have been advanced by prenatal
care. 45 If the expenditure can be directly related to treatment or care of
been
the fetus, or if the health of the fetus can be shown to have
46
promoted in a specific fashion, the result would be otherwise.
III.

EDUCATION AND OTHER EXPENSES OF PARENTHOOD

Although ordinary school expenses for children normally are not deductible under section 213, services received from a particular institution
may be both educational and medical in character. The tax system then is
faced with the task of separating and allocating expenses incurred for
these mixed purposes. The response of the Service and of the courts to
this recurring problem of allocation adds to the personal-medical balance
0 Nor are they deductible as charitable contributions under section 170 even if paid to a
charity, because they are not gratuitous payments. Edward A. Murphy, 54 T.C. 249 (1970);
Henry L. Arceneaux, Jr., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1461 (1977). But see Wegner v. Lethert, 67-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9229 (D. Minn. 1967) (state law barred agency from charging fee; adoptive
parents' payment was charitable contribution). Compare the treatment of lump-sum payments to old-age homes operated by charitable organizations. See text accompanying note
185 infra.
41 I.R.C. § 152(b)(2).
42 I.R.C. § 152(a). For further discussion of dependency, see notes 166-74 and accompanying text infra.
" Rev. Rul. 60-255, 1960-2 C.B. 105, modifying Rev. Rul. 56-401, 1956-2 C.B. 169. Any
such qualifying reimbursement would count as part of the adoptive parents' contribution to
the child's support.
44 Cf Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 C.B. 179 (portion of legal fees identified by law firm as
allocated to tax matters held deductible under I.R.C. § 212(3) as an expense incurred in
connection with determination of a tax).
41 Benny L. Kilpatrick, 68 T.C. 469 (1977).
4' See id. at 473.
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a strong deference to considerations of administrative efficiency. The
costs of tuition, room and board, or a portion of these costs, may be
deducted in two limited situations. If the school qualifies as a "special"
school, the taxpayer may deduct the entire amount of school expenses
under certain conditions, Even if the school is not "special," the taxpayer
may still be able to deduct that portion of school expenses specifically
allocable to medical treatment.
If a parent places a child who has a specific physical or mental disorder
in a special school for the principal reason that it provides treatment,
psychiatric services, or special programming, the school cost is a medical
expense; the parent may deduct the entire cost of tuition, room and
board. 4 7 The regulations offer as examples of special schools those
that teach braille or lip-reading. 4 In Revenue Ruling 70-285, 4 9 the taxpayer resided in a public school district that had no special education
program to meet the needs of his retarded son. The parent enrolled the
son in a neighboring school district having a special curriculum for the
educable mentally handicapped, for which the parent paid tuition. This
program occupied a separate classroom in a regular elementary school,
using specially trained teachers and special methods and materials. The
ruling allowed the taxpayer to deduct both the tuition and the cost of
transportation to and from the school. The ruling construed the regulation as including the special curriculum in this case because it was specifically designed for treatment of the disability and was operated apart
from the regular activities of the school system.
When the school is not a "special" one, the taxpayer nonetheless may
deduct the amounts allocated specifically to conventional medical care.
For example, a physical examination is deductible whether performed at a
school or elsewhere. 50 Inclusion of the expense for such medical attention
in the fee for tuition, room and board, however, will present questions of
allocation as to which the taxpayer probably would have the burden of
proof. 51 Although one ruling holds entirely nondeductible a lump sum
tuition payment which included access to university health services, 52 the
Tax Court has adopted a more reasonable view permitting some allocated
53
amount to be deducted.
The program outlined in Revenue Ruling 70-285 typifies the require47 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a) (1957); Rev. Rul. 58-280, 1958-1 C.B. 157.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a) (1957).
49 1970-1 C.B. 52. See also Rev. Rul. 69-607, 1969-2 C.B. 40.
50 H. Grant Atkinson, Jr., 44 T.C. 39, 54-55 (1965), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 4.
"' The taxpayer would be assisted in such allocation by Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d
540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930), under which the taxpayer may approximate or estimate the
amount attributable to medical care. Although the Cohan rule has been abrogated in the
entertainment expense area in which it originated-I.R.C. section 274-it survives elsewhere
and has been applied to medical expenses. Walter D. Bye, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 238, 240-41
(1972).
2 Rev. Rul. 54-457, 1954-2 C.B. 100.
53 C. Fink Fischer, 50 T.C. 164, 176 (1968), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxiv. See also text accompanying notes 61 & 62 infra.
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ments for a special school. The school must treat its rehabilitative or
health treatment function as primary and the usual learning process as
secondary; additionally, medical services must be the principal reason for
the child's attendance.5 4 Moreover, the special treatment given must have
a direct relationship to a specific medical condition; and, in the particular
case, the services must reasonably be expected to have some beneficial
effect. 55 That the program was entered upon the recommendation of a
56
physician may be a factor but will not be dispositive.
It is sometimes difficult, however, to distinguish a school's regular
education function from its therapeutic qualities, particularly when the
disability to be treated is of a mental or emotional nature. 57 Two cases
decided by the Tax Court at about the same time illustrate the problem.
In Lawrence D. Greisdorf,5 8 the taxpayer's stepdaughter had severe emotional difficulties, which were aggravated by the suicide of the girl's
natural father when she was nine years old. On the advice of a psychiatrist, the taxpayers enrolled her in the Mills School, a private school
specifically established to provide an environment in which students with
psychological learning disabilities could adjust and function normally in a
competitive classroom situation. Classes were small, two psychiatrists
served the school as consultants, and psychologists were employed on the
staff. As part of the services provided by the school, the girl was tested
extensively and spent an hour each day in either private therapy or group
therapy. The Tax Court perceived the relevant question as framed by the
regulations to be whether the school was a "special school"-one in which
the resources for alleviating the mental and emotional handicap were a
principal reason for the girl's presence. The Tax Court held that the Mills
School met this criterion and the educational program was only incidental
to its medical function. Therefore, the full cost of the school to the
taxpayers was deductible.
By contrast, Paul H. Ripple59 involved a boy who had problems in
5 See Martin J. Lichterman, 37 T.C. 586, 595 (1961).
5 See, e.g., Everett F. Glaze, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1276, 1278 (1961); Maurice Feinberg, 25
T.C.M. (CCH) 777 (1966).
56 See Kaufman v. United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9182 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Once the
school qualifies as "special," parents may deduct the costs of transporting the child to a
distant school. The costs of one parent to accompany the child on the trip are also deductible
if the child cannot travel alone by reason of his age, physical condition, or need for care en
route. I.T. 3786, 1946-1 C.B. 75, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 C.B. 310, 312. See
also Robert M. Rose, 52 T.C. 521 (1969), aff'dper curiam, Rose v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 149
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971) (expenses of accompanying parent deductible, but expenses of second parent, who followed later, disallowed); cf. Bertha M. Rodgers,
25 T.C. 254, 262 (1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1957). But the parent may not deduct
the cost of establishing a new home near the child's school so that the parent could take the
child to school each day and care for him when he was not in class. Bercovitz v. United
States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9591 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
" See generally Muchin, Private Schooling for Emotionally Disturbed Children: Is It a
Medical Expense?, 44 Taxes 699 (1966); Nathan, Is Attendance at a Private School Medical
Treatment?-A Doctor's Viewpoint, 44 Taxes 704 (1966).
58 54 T.C. 1684 (1970), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xix.
9 54 T.C. 1442 (1970).
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reading and emotional adjustment. His psychiatric report recommended a
full-time school program of reading help in an institution like the Matthews School, where the taxpayers, his parents, then enrolled him. Teachers
in the Matthews School had special training to teach reading, and some
held degrees in psychology. The school provided an academic program
with emphasis on corrective and remedial reading, and it focused on the
educational problems of children who had both emotional and educational difficulties. The school's license did not mention treatment of emotionally disturbed children, nor did it maintain a staff psychiatrist. However, a clinical *psychologist, associated with the school as a consultant,
gave the boy regularly scheduled psychotherapy. The Tax Court, again
looking to the character of the school, held that it provided primarily
an educational program rather than a medical service. Most of the
expenses-meals, lodging and tuition paid to the school-could not be
deducted without a showing that part of the tuition could be allocated to a
special component in the classroom work designed to deal with emotional
problems. The psychologist's fee, separately stated, concededly was deductible.
Asking whether a school is primarily "special" seems to be an artificial
and inexact means of determining the specific character of the services
rendered. Both cases above involved a mix of therapeutic and educational
motives. The virtues of the special school test lie in its administrability.
Classifying the institution is easier than trying to disentangle each parent's
motives inasmuch as it provides a more objective set of factors to evaluate.
Once made, the determination can apply to many taxpayer-parents. Advance planning by both producers and consumers of the service is facilitated. The test may nonetheless have unfortunate consequences. If deductibility turns on the separate, distinct identity of the institution 'or the
program, it follows that the cost of classroom treatment integrating the
child with normal or well children may not be deducted, notwithstanding
that a physician or other medical expert may prescribe such an environment as more conducive to the child's good health than a separate facility.
Several cases have so held. 60 In this respect, the tax system, in the interests
of administrative ease, favors more drastic types of therapy because they
are more easily identified.
60 See Newkirk v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9452 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Kaufman v.
United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. $ 9182 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); H. Grant Atkinson, Jr., 44 T.C. 39
(1965), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 4 (deduction limited to cost of physical examination and related
services); Israel J. Weinberg, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 10 (1969); Edward S. Enck, 26 T.C.M. (CCH)
314 (1967); Gordon Pascal, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 434 (1956); Private Rul. 77-28,011 (1977)
(autistic child placed in regular nursery). See also Martin v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 633 (6th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Arnold P. Grunwald, 51 T.C. 108 (1968). In Rev. Rul. 65-255,
1965-2 C.B. 76, the Service allowed deduction of the cost of transporting a polio victim to a
regular school when the primary purpose of having the child in school was therapeutic.
Doctors had advised that, if the illness advanced as expected, the education would be of no
value to the child. On these peculiar facts, there was no allocation problem. Absent any
possible educational benefit, the motive for attendance cannot be questioned and the special
school test is unnecessary.
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In at least one case, however, the Tax Court took a less Draconian view,
allowing a substantial deduction even when the school itself was not
special. In C. Fink Fischer,61 the taxpayer enrolled his child in a school
primarily to deal with the child's emotional problems. Although the child's
instruction was individualized, the Tax Court held that the school was not
special within the meaning of the regulations. Yet the court permitted the
taxpayer to deduct the excess cost of sending the child to this school over
the cost of attending other private schools in the area because of the
school's ability to treat the child's difficulties.6 2 Although the result departs from the all-or-nothing approach to special schools, it is consistent
with the "but for" test applied by the Tax Court in other factual situations.6" Under that test, when an expenditure may be incurred for both
medical and nonmedical reasons, the Tax Court will treat it as incurred
for medical care if the expenditure has a therapeutic purpose and would
not have been incurred but for a medical need. In Fischer, the extra cost
due to treatment was readily ascertainable. Moreover, we can presume
that any price paid in excess of the market price for private education is
motivated primarily by medical need.
In the special school cases, the parent might have pursued two possible
choices if the child had no unusual health needs. All children have access
to free public education. But some parents pay for private school services
with no health-related motive, and the taxpayer claiming a medical deduction also might have done so. To the extent that a taxpayer incurs costs
that exceed private school tuition, as in Fischer, he plainly buys something
in addition to educational services. Because he does so for medical treatment, the excess is properly deducted. In contrast, the amount equal to
private school tuition presents a mixture of motives: the parent sends the
child to school both to treat the emotional disturbance and to improve
normal skills. To avoid the question of which intent predominated, deduction of this base amount appropriately turns on the somewhat more
objective institution-by-institution examination that the "special" school
inquiry affords.
Use of the special school or but-for tests requires that the expenditure
have a therapeutic purpose. One index of this purpose is the proximity of
the expense and the condition for which treatment is claimed. Thus, cases
have denied a deduction when the cost is remote from the illness and the
patient to be treated, notwithstanding that the cost undeniably was incurred by reason of medical exigency. 64 In one case,6 5 the taxpayer's
61 50 T.C. 164 (1968), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxiv.
62 Id. at 175-76.
63 See, e.g., text accompanying note 78 infra.
64 See, e.g., Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952). In Ochs, the taxpayer
incurred school expenses for his children in order to assure that his wife, who was recovering from a cancer operation, would have the necessary quiet and absence of strain to
recover. Over Judge Frank's passionate dissent, the court found the expense too remote, and
analogized it to employment of a governess or cook to replace services that the wife could no
longer provide because of her illness, rather than to treatment or mitigation of the disease.
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daughter was ridiculed by her classmates because her family suffered
from a hereditary disfiguring disease. The other children refused to
touch the toys she played with or have other contact with her. On the
advice of a physician, the taxpayer changed his name and moved to
another community. When he sought to deduct the loss on the sale of his
residence, the court held the loss nondeductible; it noted that the loss
resulted from a substantial investment he had made in the property and a
general decline in property values in the area. 66 In contrast, when a health
motivation is the only reasonable explanation for incurring the cost, or
when the nonmedical dimension of the expenditure is insignificant, the
but-for test alone is enough. The cost of maintaining a seeing-eye dog for
a blind person, 6 7 the expense of hiring someone to accompany a blind
child to and from school and to classes during the day 6 and the excess
cost of books and magazines in braille over regular books and magazines69
all may be deducted as medical expenses.
In a closer case, the Service allowed a deduction for clarinet lessons
recommended by an orthodontist to remedy a malocclusion. 70 This appears to be about as far as the Service will go in characterizing as medical
treatment what would ordinarily be normal personal activity. When the
possibility of personal motive is large, the but-for test usually places a
high, if not impossible, burden on the taxpayer to prove what would have
happened had the medical need not been present. Thus, the Tax Court
denied a medical expense deduction for tuition at a ballet academy even
though an active exercise program had been prescribed as treatment for
the taxpayer's daughter who suffered from undue curvature of the
spine. 7 The girl's prior interest in ballet was perhaps dispositive, because
theTax Court ruled that the taxpayer could obtain the deduction only by
showing that the child would not otherwise have been enrolled in the
72
school.

IV.

FOOD, DRINK AND TRAVEL

A taxpayer on a special diet may not deduct its cost to the extent that it
merely equals usual food expenses. 73 But if a physician prescribes the
The services purchased in Ochs provided not only medical and personal benefits to the wife
but also some clearly personal benefits to other members of the family. In the court's view,
the medical motivation for the expense did not predominate.
6' Mark R. Harding, 46 T.C. 502 (1966).
" See also Lawrence Prem, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 873 (1962) (moving and travel expenses
incurred by taxpayer's family in accompanying her from Maryland to a more hospitable
climate in California to ameliorate a medical condition are not deductible); Rev. Rul. 68-319,
1968-1 C.B. 92.
87 Rev. Rul. 57-461, 1957-2 C.B. 116.
68 Rev. Rul. 64-173, 1964-1 C.B. 121.
69 Rev. Rul. 75-318, 1975-2 C.B. 88.
" Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 C.B. 89. However, the taxpayer could deduct only the cost of
a clarinet of sufficient quality to perform the medical service.
71 Norman Ende, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1096 (1975).
72 Id. at 1101.
73 See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9411 (W.D. Ark. 1968); J.
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special diet and the taxpayer can establish the excess cost of the special
diet over a normal diet, he may deduct the excess; indeed, the taxpayer
may deduct the expense of a nip of brandy prescribed by a physician to
relieve angina pains. 4 Although neither the statute nor the regulations
condition deduction of these expenses on a physician's supervision, this
requirement, supplied by cases and rulings, serves the salutary function of
distinguishing special diets dictated by medical needs from those that
proceed from more idiosyncratic motives. When taxpayers who were allergists established that they suffered severe adverse physical reactions from
artificial chemical additives in foods, the Tax Court allowed them to
deduct the added cost of natural foods.75 Absent medical evidence of
physical reaction, however, organic foods and vitamins are nondeductible
expenses even if the taxpayer believes them to be good for health. 76 If the
excess cost of the special diet constitutes medical care, costs of transportation to obtain such care have been held to be deductible as well. Thus, in
holding deductible the additional cost of preparing salt-free meals in
restaurants, the Tax Court also allowed a deduction for the amount paid
7
by the taxpayer for taxicabs to those restaurants.
The cases apply a two-pronged test, referred to earlier as a "but for"
test. Under this standard, in order for a taxpayer to justify deduction of
an expense that serves both medical and other personal functions, he
must establish that the expenditure was necessary to treatment and would
not otherwise have been incurred. 7 Rather than requiring the trier of
fact to engage in the difficult and sometimes impossible task of determining which of two motives predominated, this test identifies the marginal
cost occasioned by the medical need and grants a deduction for it. In
addition to providing a more administrable rule than a primary motive
test, the but-for test conforms to the apparent rationale of section 213, to
permit deduction for expenses that are extraordinary in nature.
Willard Harris, 46 T.C. 672 (1966); Doris V. Clark, 29 T.C. 196, 200 (1957); George H.
Collins, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1190 (1965).
Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, 312 (cautioning that the alcohol cannot be "a
substitute for . . . beverage normally consumed by [taxpayer]").
71 Theron G. Randolph, 67 T.C. 481 (1976). The taxpayers had carefully documented the
additional cost, so that the court did not have to contend with questions of proving the
amounts expended to treat the allergy. Id. at 486-87.
76 Princess E. L. Lingham, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 649, 654 (1977) (self-imposed
organic diet
did not have direct or proximate relationship to the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of
disease).
77 Leo R. Cohn, 38 T.C. 387, 391 (1962), nonacq. 1963-1 C.B. 5, acq. on other issues, 1963-1
C.B. 4. But cf. Cohn v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (deduction not
allowed for the same taxpayer in a later year for the extra cost of an accommodation with
kitchen facilities, in which his wife could prepare salt-free meals, over usual lodging). The
earlier Cohn case exemplifies the difficulty in limiting the scope of the deduction without
requiring the taxpayer to mitigate his expenses. See text accompanying notes 139-40 infra.
The taxpayer may deduct the cost of taxicabs to a restaurant because he cannot obtain
salt-free meals at his hotel, without any showing that this was the least expensive way to do
so. This approach makes administration of the deduction easier at the expense of some
claims that arguably should be denied.
78 Joel H. Jacobs, 62 T.C. 813, 819 (1974).
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One important set of distinctions between medical care and personal
recreation involves expenditures for food and lodging incidental to travel
for medical purposes. The 1939 Code included as medical care the cost of
travel to obtain medical care. 79 As used elsewhere in the Code, travel
expenses include food and lodging, 0 and such expenses were deductible
as medical care. Wealthy taxpayers who traveled long distances to resort
areas to recuperate from operations, or for other medically related reasons, could therefore deduct the full cost of wintering in Florida and the
like. To prevent this practice, the 1954 Code substituted the narrower
8
word "transportation" for "travel." Responding to the legislative history
the regulations ruled out deduction of the cost of food and lodging
incident to the travel.8 2 In Commissioner v. Bilder,8 3 the Supreme Court
upheld this reading of the statute. A heart specialist had advised the
taxpayer, a forty-three-year-old attorney with a history of heart ailments,
to spend his winters in a warm climate. He rented an apartment in
Florida, which he occupied with his family. The taxpayer deducted both
the cost of transportation to Florida and the rent for the apartment.
Finding that the trip was taken for treatment of a specific illness, and not
to enjoy.a vacation, the Tax Court allowed deduction of the plane fare
and a portion of the rent attributable to the taxpayer's own living expense.8 4 The Third Circuit extended deductibility to the full amount of
the rent.' But the Supreme Court reversed and disallowed all of the
claimed rent deduction, relying heavily on the legislative history to support its reading of the statute.88
The same legislative history was relied upon to allow deduction of food
and lodging expenses in Montgomery v. Commissioner.8 7 The taxpayers in
Montgomery sought to deduct expenses for motel rooms and restaurant
meals incurred in traveling between their home and the Mayo Clinic. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in allowing the deduction, reading
the 1954 amendment as eliminating only deductions for expenses incidental to "resort area" medication but retaining deductions for food and
lodging en route to medical care. 8 8 The Seventh Circuit went one step
further, extending deductibility to a special post-operative care situation.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(x), 56 Stat. 825-26 (1942).
See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2).
s1 See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 60 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4017, 4197; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20 (1954),
reprinted in [1954] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4021, 4856.
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iv) (1957).
83 369 U.S. 499 (1962).
84 33 T.C. 155 (1959).
85 289 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961).
86 369 U.S. at 502-03 (citing S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20 (1954); H.R.
Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 60 (1954)). Both committee reports discuss the
hypothetical case of a patient traveling to Florida to alleviate chronic ailments; they concluded that transportation expenses should be deductible, but not living expenses while in
Florida.
87 51 T.C. 410, 413-14 (1968), aff'd, 428 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1970).
88 428 F.2d 243, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1970).
79
80
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In Kelly v. Commissioner,8 9 the taxpayer had undergone surgery in New
York after suffering an appendicitis attack while there on a business trip.
His hospital discharged him shortly after the operation because of a room
shortage, but his physician advised him not to return home immediately.
The taxpayer rented a hotel room until his doctor decided he was strong
enough to leave New York. The taxpayer deducted the cost of lodging
and food at the hotel. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction under
section 1.213-1(e)(1)(v) of the regulations, which allows the deduction of
food and lodging only for inpatient hospital care and for care in an
institution other than a hospital. 90 In effect, the Seventh Circuit treated
the hotel room as an "institution" within the regulations because it was
necessary to the taxpayer's recovery. 9 1
The 1954 amendment, the regulation and Bilder reflect a general concern to prevent deduction of expenses for personal enjoyment in the
guise of medical expenses-here, vacations in generally attractive surroundings. In both Montgomery and Kelly, the element of personal enjoyment as an admixture to the medical care was minimal, and in that respect
the result is sound. Applying the "but for" test, it is clear the expenses
both were related to treatment and would not have been incurred without
medical reasons. The difficulty is in limiting deductibility to such cases,
while disallowing expenses motivated both by medical care and personal
consumption elements. The distinction is frequently easy to make. Thus,
in Revenue Ruling 76-79,92 the taxpayer, on his doctor's advice, took a
cruise with a group of physicians. While on the cruise ship, the physicians
reviewed the patient's medical records, performed certain tests on him
and reported the progress of his condition to his home physician. In
addition, they provided seminars on the taxpayer's physical condition and
supervised his dietary program. The taxpayer could have obtained similar
medical services in his home town. The ruling disallowed all the expenses
except those directly related to examination of the medical records, performance of tests and transmission of the results to the patient's personal
physician. 93 A case for deductibility would have been made if the services
had been unique and not otherwise obtainable. But sometimes the distinc89 440 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1971).
90 The other requirement for complete deductibility under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.2131(e)(l)(v)(a) (1957)-that medical care be a principal reason for the institutionalizationclearly was met.
91 But see Loren Wilks, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1086 (1968) (denying deduction for lodging
during outpatient treatment for terminal cancer). The decision in Kelly makes sense to the
extent that the services received from the hotel merely served as a substitute for the services
the taxpayer would have received in the hospital had there been room. The Seventh Circuit
made no effort to account for the difference, if any, between hospital and hotel costs.
92

1976-1 C.B. 70.

93 The ruling stated that the seminars promoted only the taxpayer's general well-being

and thus were nondeductible. Id. Compare the disallowance under section 162 of professional education expenses in a vacation setting. Reuben B. Hoover, 35 T.C. 566 (1961)
(allowing deduction of only that portion of the expense of a lecture cruise that the court
estimated to equal the cost of attending lectures at a university).

1978]

MEDICAL EXPENSE TAX DEDUCTION

tion between medical and personal expense is not so clear. In Revenue
Ruling 75-187, 9 4 the taxpayers underwent treatment for a sexual problem, concededly a medical expense. Their physician advised them that the
probability of successful treatment would be enhanced if they resided at a
hotel rather than at the hospital during the treatment period. Without
citing Kelly, the ruling found the lodging cost nondeductible because, in
the Service's view, it was indistinguishable from a stay in any other personal residence. 95 Applying the but-for test, the opposite result should
obtain. The taxpayers presumably continued to maintain their normal
residence; the hotel expense was in excess of their normal living expense
96
and was incurred only to obtain the best medical treatment.
Other long distance travel may involve an admixture of personal or
recreational motive. A taxpayer who travels to another location for alleviation of a particular ailment and not for general health improvement may
deduct his transportation.9 7 The cost of transporting his nurse-or spouse
acting as his nurse-is also deductible. 98 And a taxpayer may deduct the
transportation cost of visiting a physician in another city if he has more
confidence in him-notwithstanding that he spends some time in social or
recreational activities on the trip-provided that the trip's primary purpose is medical. 99 As in the business expense area, the cost of transportation need not be allocated so long as the primary motive is not personal or
recreational. 10 0 When the taxpayer uses his own automobile to provide
medical transportation, he may deduct either the out-of-pocket costs paid
by him or the standard mileage allowance of seven cents per mile. 1 1
Neither method is intended to allow for depreciation on the automobile.
This is consistent both with the statutory limitation of the deduction to a
"payment" for medical expenses and with the regulations' general rule
allowing medical capital expenses to be deducted in the year of payment.
02
For these purposes, depreciation is not a payment.1
94 1975-1 C.B. 92.

" The ruling did cite Wade Volwiler, 57 T.C. 367 (1971), in which the taxpayer's
daughter resided separately in a rooming house as part of her psychiatric care. The Tax
Court disallowed the deduction of the rooming house cost on the grounds that it was not a
medical institution or otherwise specially equipped for treatment. It should be noted that
there was no duplication of the daughter's residence expense in that she resided only in the
rooming, house, although she could have avoided even that expense by living at home.
'0 See also Sidney J. Ungar, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 766 (1963) (allowing deduction of rent of an
apartment used in lieu of a hospital room).
17 Rev. Rul. 58-110, 1958-1 C.B. 155.
98 Carasso v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 874 (1962);
Leo R. Cohn, 38 T.C. 387, 390 (1962), acq. 1963-1 C.B. 4; I.T. 3786, 1946-1 C.B. 75,
declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 C.B. 310, 312. See also Robert M. Rose, 52 T.C. 521
(1969), aff'd per curiam, 435 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971)
(transportation expenses of one parent accompanying child for medical care deductible, but
not those of a second parent who followed later).
" Stanley D. Winderman, 32 T.C. 1197 (1959), acq. 1960-2 C.B. 7.
10 Compare id. with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1) (1958).
101 Rev. Proc. 74-24, 1974-2 C.B. 477.
"' See Maurice S. Gordon, 37 T.C. 986 (1962) (depreciation on automobile used to
transport son to doctor not deductible under section 213). But cf. Sanford H. Weinzimer, 17
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WORK

Occasionally, expenses for medical treatment help the taxpayer to pursue his trade or business. In this case, the taxpayer normally seeks to
deduct the expenditure as a business expense because the three percent
of AGI limitation does not apply to business expenses. In addition, a
business expense is deductible whether or not the taxpayer itemizes de03
ductions. 1
Prior to enactment of the medical expense deduction in 1942, taxpayers sometimes sought to characterize health-related expenses as trade
or business expenses, this being the only way to deduct those costs. This
argument was successful for the actor whose teeth were knocked out in
the course of making a movie10 4 but not for the actor who bought
dentures to relieve a speech impediment. 05 More recently, the Service
disallowed as trade or business expenses the costs claimed by psychologists
for their own psychoanalysis,10 6 even though such treatment is a prerequisite for practicing psychoanalysis. The Service's position apparently
was based on the view that, in such circumstances, psychoanalysis constituted preparation for a new business and therefore was nondeductible.
The First and Fourth Circuits reached different conclusions on this issue.' 0 7 Even under the latter's more restrictive view, the taxpayer might
still defend the deduction as a medical expense by showing that a principal motive for the treatment was to cure a mental disorder. 0 8 The Service
now has altered its position and permits the deduction. 0 9
One recurring factual pattern-that of the nonworking wife who accompanies her husband on business trips because the husband's medical
T.C.M. (CCH) 712 (1958) (allowing deduction for depreciation of specially equipped automobile necessary to transport handicapped person to work). The result in Gordon was
carefully preserved in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 & n.11 (1974),
which construed the words "paid out" in section 263 to include depreciation of certain
equipment. The Court noted that payment for purposes of the medical expense or charitable deduction excluded depreciation, but found that line of authority irrelevant to the
application of section 263.
103 However, only enumerated expenses may be claimed when the trade or business
consists of services performed by the taxpayer as an employee. See I.R.C. § 62(1).
104 Reginald Denny, 33 B.T.A. 738 (1935), nonacq. XV-1 C.B. 30 (1936).
0I Sparkman v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1940). See also Madge H. Evans,
1939 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 39,101 (denying deduction for actress' tonsillectomy). A recent ruling
denied a deduction for health spa expenses incurred by a law enforcement officer who was
required to be in excellent physical condition. Rev. Rul. 78-128, 1978-15 I.R.B. 7. But see
Charles Hutchison, 13 B.T.A. 1187 (1928) (allowing deduction for stunt man's physical
training exercise).
106 See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, 38 T.C. 765 (1962).
10 Greenberg v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966) (allowing deduction); Namrow v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961) (denying
deduction).
1018288 F.2d at 653. See also David E. Starrett, 41 T.C. 877 (1964) (allowing deduction for
cost of psychoanalysis for medical care despite additional benefit to taxpayer of qualifying
for admission to school of psychoanalytic training).
109 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii) ex. (4) (1967) (allowing deduction of the cost of
psychoanalytic training to improve or maintain taxpayer's skills).
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condition requires special attention-has sparked strong disagreements
over the proper test for business expense deductibility in general.11 0 In
the typical case, although the wife does not contribute directly to the trade
or business aspects of the trip, the taxpayer seeks to deduct her expenses
under section 162. In addition to the other advantages of a business
deduction noted above, the wife's food and lodging costs may be deducted
under section 162 if the travel otherwise qualifies for deduction; under
section 213, in contrast, the same costs usually cannot be deducted as
transportation costs, even if the service constitutes medical care."'
The Tax Couirt's position on this question has been to deny deductions
for the wife's travel under section 162, a position that is consistent with
the more general disallowance of travel expenses for wives when their
services are not directly related to the trade or business.112 In Preston R.
Rieley, 11 3 the husband's job with the Department of Labor required occasional trips away from his home office. On his doctor's advice, the husband, a diabetic, did not travel alone but had his wife join him; she
understood his regimen of medication, diet and exercise. The Tax Court
denied deduction of her travel expenses because they were unrelated to
the husband's trade or business as a Department of Labor employee;" 4 in
so doing, the Tax Court cited an earlier case, William E. Reisner,'1 5 which
also disallowed deductions for a wife's travel expenses. In Reisner, the wife
had accompanied her executive husband to attend to his health while he
was on a business trip. After finding that the trip was not for pleasure, the
court nevertheless concluded that her expense was too remote. from the
1 16
husband's trade or business.
These cases apparently construe the "ordinary and necessary" test for
deductibility in section 162 as requiring an expense to be directly productive of goods and services in the particular trade or business. Under this
view, a taxpayer may not deduct an expense related to the trade or
110 The legal questions would be identical for a nonworking husband who accompanies.
his wife on a business trip, but all the cases to date have involved wives accompanying
working husbands and that terminology will be followed.
"' See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
112 United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968); Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C.
650, 661 (1962); see Stratton v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1971). But see United
States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1969) (allowing deduction for wife's travel expenses
when her presence was necessary to enhance corporation's "family image").
" 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 449 (1964).
114 The question of deductibility of these expenses under section 213 never arose in Rieley
because the taxpayer had claimed the standard deduction in his return and did not claim a
medical deduction in his Tax Court petition. Id. at 451.
115 34 T.C. 1122 (1960).
116 Id. at 1131. As in Rieley, the Tax Court found that it could not rule on deductibility
under section 213 because the taxpayer failed to claim a medical expense deduction on his
return and also failed to raise it in his Tax Court petition. 34 T.C. at 1131-32.
Both Rieley and Reisner relied upon an early case, George W. Megeath, 5 B.T.A. 1274
(1927), in which the Board of Tax Appeals summarily denied deduction of the trans-Atlantic
steamship expenses the taxpayer had paid for his wife and nurse to join him on a business
trip because of his poor health.
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business, even if the expense would not otherwise be incurred, unless it is
a normal market component of the product.'1 7
The Tax Court's position on medically motivated travel accompaniment
has not prevailed in other courts. In Allenberg Cotton Co. v. United States, Is
the taxpayer corporation sought to deduct the travel expenses of its
president, who was a diabetic, and his wife, for a business trip to Europe.
The president's doctor had recommended that his wife accompany him.
The district court allowed the deduction under section 162, reasoning that
the trip was necessary to the business, the wife was necessary to the trip,
and section 162 did not require more. Similarly, in Quinn v. United
States, I" another district court permitted deduction of expenses incurred
by the wife of a diabetic executive to accompany him on a business trip.
In addition, in two recent rulings the Service implicitly departed from
its prior litigating position. Revenue Ruling 75-316120 held deductible
under section 162 amounts paid to readers by blind professionals and
semiprofessionals to assist them in their work. This ruling applied a
three-part test: the taxpayer may deduct such expenses if they are necessary to the work, if they produce only incidental benefit outside the work
context, and if the Code and regulations are silent as to this particular
expense. The result in this instance seems unobjectionable because the
expenditure has no personal enjoyment consequences. But application of
this test in the next ruling led to more surprising results.
Revenue Ruling 75-317121 discussed two situations in which handicapped individuals paid for the travel, meals and lodging of persons who
assisted them on business trips. In the first situation, the taxpayer required aid only when away from home: he was confined to a wheelchair
and needed help in overcoming architectural barriers, carrying baggage
and traveling on an airline that does not accept unaccompanied
passengers in a wheelchair. In the second situation, the taxpayer required
such assistance even under regular working conditions; in addition, he
required assistance for driving, daily removal and replacement of
prostheses, and administration of medication. In both cases, the taxpayer's wife often performed the needed service. Applying the three-part
test announced in the previous ruling, Revenue Ruling 75-317 reached
opposite conclusions in the two situations. Expenses in the first case were
found to be deductible under section 162; they also qualified as adjustments to gross income under section 62 as employee travel expenses, even
when the taxpayer's wife was the companion. The Service reasoned that
I7 Consistent with this view, the regulations deny deduction of commuting expenses, see
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (1958), and the Tax Court denied deduction of child care expenses
as business expenses. See Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd mem., 113 F.2d 114
(2d Cir. 1940).
118 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9131 (W.D. Tenn. 1960).
119 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9369 (D. Md. 1976). In both cases, the expenditure was not
included in the income of the individuals.
120 1975-2 C.B. 54.
III 1975-2 C.B. 57.
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the expenses were necessary to work and were incurred only on these
trips. In the second situation, however, the amounts expended were
regularly required for the taxpayer's personal activities and therefore did
not meet the second branch of the test. These expenses were akin to
nursing service expenses, which are expressly enumerated as medical
expenses in the regulations.' 2 2 Because payments to outsiders for providing the services would be medical expenses, this analysis precludes any
deductions for food and lodging expenses of the wife, which expenses are
nondeductible under section 213.
This ruling seems to be an unfortunate compromise which departs
23
from the stricter view of business expenses taken in earlier rulings.1
Application of the second requirement in Revenue Ruling 75-316-that
the goods or services not be used in the individual's personal activitiesseems particularly misdirected in the case of travel assistance expenses of
the handicapped. Other applications of this test, such as to cases involving
seeing-eye dogs, involve expenditures that may buy a mixture of business
and personal use, not readily allocated between the two. In the case of the
handicapped, allocation of cost for each trip presents no problem. If the
Service sought to broaden the nature of the causality which defines business expenses of a medical nature, its resolution in Revenue Ruling
75-317 is questionable. The Service should treat similarly the travel expenses of the handicapped person who needs daily assistance and the
handicapped person who needs assistance only during travel. If the
touchstone is that the taxpayer incurs extra expense in taking the trip, he
does so in both cases and satisfies but-for causality. If the concern is that
the taxpayer may obtain an improper deduction for the personal expense
of a wife joining her husband on a trip, that danger remains despite a
requirement that the services not be used daily by the handicapped
person.
Even the Tax Court now appears to be changing its earlier view on the
124
nondeductibility of travel assistance under section 162. Robert E. Drury
dealt with a deduction claimed by a scholar for his expenses in publishing
a scholarly article when the normal channels of publication were blocked
by a rival. In the course of its opinion allowing the deduction, the Tax
Court cited Quinn with apparent approval for the proposition that a
Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957).
M2The Service formerly considered the cost of a seeing-eye dog to be a medical, not a
business, expense, Rev. Rul. 57-461, 1957-2 C.B. 116, and it similarly characterized a
professional singer's throat treatment expenses. Rev. Rul. 71-45, 1971-1 C.B. 51. In the same
vein, the Tax Court held a lawyer's hearing aid to be a medical expense. Paul Bakewell, Jr.,
23 T.C. 803 (1955). By contrast, the Service found the cost of frequent medical examinations, which were a condition of flight agents' employment, to be deductible business
expenses. Rev. Rul. 58-382, 1958-2 C.B. 59. Yet the flight agent case is distinguishable from
the travel assistance expense cases: all flight agents must incur the same expense so that the
cost of medical examinations becomes "ordinary and necessary" to all in the business; the
travel assistance expense, however, is unique to the handicapped.
124 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 835 (1977).
122
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handicapped person could claim a trade or business deduction for his
wife's travel expenses necessitated by the handicap.12
To recapitulate, the Tax Court and Service originally treated the wife's
expenses as lacking the requisite business purpose because her services
were not directly involved in the trade or business. Under the more recent
Service view, she supplies that business purpose by making it possible for
the husband to make the trip, but her services revert to personal in
character if they are needed apart from the trip. Quinn and Allenberg go
further. Instead of distinguishing services needed only for trips from
services needed generally, these district court cases allow the deduction if
the expenses would not have been incurred but for the business trip. In a
private ruling, 126 the Service sought to limit Quinn to its facts and continues to rely on the authority of Rieley, Reisner and Revenue Ruling
75-317.
The earlier Service view finds support in cases and rulings that distinguish business from personal expenses in other factual settings. Judicial
decisions initially treated child care expenses as personal and refused to
accept but-for causality, until the result was altered by statute. 127 More
recently, the Tax Court held expenses of compulsory home leave for a
foreign service officer to be inherently personal in nature. 28 Commuting
expenses have long been classified as personal, notwithstanding that the
taxpayer would not incur them but for the need to work.1 29 In Fausnerv.
Commissioner,130 the Supreme Court affirmed the disallowance of any
deduction for the cost of carrying tools to work by car in a situation in
which the taxpayer concededly would have driven to work in any event.
The Court added that, if additional costs are incurred to transport jobrequired tools, an allocation of cost between the personal commuting
expense and the business expense might be feasible. A similar "additional
expense" approach applies to clothes needed for a job, which are treated
as business expenses only when they are unsuitable for everyday wear. t 3 1
125 Id. at 838. The opinion gave no indication that this represented a change in position
from Rieley, Reisner and Megeath.
"2
Private Rul. 77-43,051 (July 28, 1977).
127 Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940); see Feld,
Deductibility of Expenses for Child Care and Household Services: New Section 214, 27 Tax
L. Rev. 415, 416-18 (1972). Section 44A now allows a 20% credit for certain dependent and
household expenses. I.R.C. § 44A(a).
12 David I. Hitchcock, 66 T.C. 950 (1976). See also Richard Drake, 52 T.C. 842 (1969)
(disallowing deduction for soldier's mandatory haircuts); Robert C. Fryer, 33 T.C.M. (CCH)
122 (1974) (same for airline pilot).
129 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (1958). For an analysis questioning the logic of this result, see
Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 871 (1969). See also
Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 C.B. 59 (allowing deduction of costs of transporting materials
necessary for work to the extent that such costs exceed regular commuting costs).
130 413 U.S. 838 (1973) (per curiam).
121 See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(8) (1958); Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 C.B. 34. Compare
Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959) (denying deduction for clothes not
specifically required as condition of employment and which might be adapted to ordinary
use). See also Betsy Lusk Yeomans, 30 T.C. 757 (1958) (allowing deduction of cost of clothes
worn by fashion coordinator during work when clothes were not suitable for personal wear).
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In these cases, both the tools and the clothes are directly related to income
production. Fausner suggests a two-step approach: first, determine
whether the expense is directly related to the business activity; if so, allow
the additional cost as a deduction.
As applied to the two situations in Revenue Ruling 75-317, this two-step
approach suggests nondeductibility of the wife's expenses under section
162 if deductible business expenses are considered to be only those that
are directly productive of goods or services. However, if one views business expenses as those that render the conduct of business possible, the
additional expense approach of Fausner allows the costs connected with
the wife's travel to be deducted in both situations, as occurred in Allenberg
and Quinn. On balance, the Service's initial view appears more consistent
with prior section 162 authority, which would treat the transportation
expenses and food and lodging expenses of third parties as deductible
medical expenses.
VI.

REPAIRS AND IMPROVEMENTS

Conventional physical health care presents little practical problem for
deduction. The distinction between care for a particular ailment and
expenses for general well-being has served well in practice to minimize
controversy. Surprisingly little litigation arises over memberships in health
spas, expenses for massages and the like, which may have both general
good effect and particular impact on a specific ailment.' 32 Selfprescription has not fared well, at least when the treatment has nonmedical dimensions. One case denied a deduction for dancing lessons as a
treatment for varicose veins. 133 Similarly, the Service's ruling as to special
diets, permitting a deduction for excess costs over normal food, was
conditioned on a physician's prescription.1 3 4 And the famous ruling granting a deduction for clarinet lessons to remedy a malocclusion would have
been unthinkable without the recommendation of an orthodontist. 3 5 The
line apparently has been to disallow deductions for idiosyncratic personalized expenses, without foreclosing unconventional medical treat13 6
ment.
Expenses for beautification are usually considered personal expenses,
132 See Rev. Rul. 55-261,

1955-1 C.B. 307, 310 (health spa fees are deductible only when

treatment is prescribed by physician and substantiated in writing as necessary to medical
care).
'3s

Adler v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1964).

134 Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, 312. See also notes 73-77 and accompanying text
supra.
135 Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 C.B. 89. See also Ann Coopersmith, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1203

(1971).
136 The Service thus ruled that health treatment, even if not recognized by the state nor

provided by a licensed practitioner, constituted medical care. Rev. Rul. 72-593, 1972-2 C.B.
180 (permitting deduction of acupuncture expenses); Rev. Rul. 63-91, 1963-1 C.B. 54
(proscription against deduction for illegal expenses does not extend to illegality solely by
reason of practitioner's failure to obtain license).
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unless incurred in a conventional medical context. Thus, cosmetics are not
deductible, 137 but cosmetic surgery is.' 38 And in one situation in which a
doctor prescribed a wig for the mental health of a girl who had lost her
hair due to disease, the Service ruled the expense deductible.1 3 9 These
distinctions seem sensible as ruling out deductions for common personal
expenses but without examining too closely the motive and purpose of a
particular medical procedure performed in accordance with usual hospital and physician practice. In like fashion, the taxpayer bears no tax duty
to mitigate his medical expenses. He is not required to accept the least
costly medical treatment, even if the extra cost is expended primarily for
personal comfort rather than quality of health care. The full cost of a
private hospital room is a medical expense even if a cheaper semi-private
room would have done just as well for the patient's medical needs. 140 This
rule undoubtedly permits some deduction for expenditures that may be
regarded as primarily personal, but the rule is an administrative necessity.
It avoids in each instance a potential dispute over cost allocations or
quality comparisons between the health care actually purchased and
hypothetical care then available.
More problematic than expenditures for physical treatment are those
made for mental illness and related problems. Traditional psychiatric or
psychological treatment is a medical expense, as might be expected. 14 1 But
when the therapy extends to activities normally considered recreational,
or to common personal items or services, the courts and the Service have
been more skeptical. 142 The Tax Court disallowed a deduction for
"milieu" therapy, in which the patient was encouraged to make purchases
of furniture, remodel a cottage and incur comparable expenses. 4 3 Similarly, dancing lessons prescribed as therapy for an emotionally disturbed
person were not deductible.1 44 In another case, the court held that,
notwithstanding the advice of the taxpayer's psychiatrist that his depression would probably continue as long as he was married, the cost of a
divorce was not a medical expense. 41 Nor is the cost of marriage counsel,I?Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(2) (1957).
18 Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81.
'39 Rev. Rul. 62-189, 1962-2 C.B. 88.
140 But cf. Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 C.B. 89 (limiting deduction of the cost of clarinet
lessons designed to remedy a malocclusion to that amount needed for treatment).
141 Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307.
141 For example, although the Service ruled that amounts paid to Christian Scientist
practitioners were deductible as medical expenses, Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307,
authorities have not extended this line very far. The Tax Court denied deductions for a trip
to Lourdes, see Vincent P. Ring, 23 T.C. 950 (1955), and for Scientology processing. Donald
H. Brown, 62 T.C. 551, aff'd per curiam, 523 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1975).
"" Frank M. Rabb, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1972). See also Wade Volwiler, 57 T.C. 367
(1971) (items must be used "primarily" for medical purposes).
'44 John J. Thoene, 33 T.C. 62 (1959) (doctor recommended a general program of
exercise and social activity, including dancing); cf. Leon S. Altman, 53 T.C. 487 (1969)
(emphysema victim's deduction for transportation costs to golf course disallowed); Private
Rul. 78-03,037 (1978).
141 Joel H. Jacobs, 62 T.C. 813 (1974). The Tax Court added that the taxpayer had failed
to show that but for the depression he suffered he would not have petitioned for divorce.
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ing deductible, on the ground that the expense is made to improve the
4
But
marriage and not to alleviate or treat a mental disease or defect.
psychiatric treatment for sexual inadequacy or incompatability is treated
147
While the
as medical care because it affects a function of the body.
distinction is one of degree, it is analogous to that made in the physical
area between expenses for the taxpayer's general well-being and those
made for a specific problem.
For capital items, the regulations allow a deduction for expenditures in
14
This rule
the year of payment, less any increase in value to other assets.
wheelchairs
prostheses,
of
deductibility
the
to
as
questions
eliminates most
1 49
and similar capital investments suited only to the ill or handicapped.
Thus, a taxpayer may deduct the excess cost of adapting an automobile to
50
The alternative-to require a
accommodate a wheelchair passenger.'
to capitalize the cost
improvements,
from
repairs
taxpayer to distinguish
life of the assetuseful
the
over
cost
the
depreciate
of the latter, and to
would seem to burden unduly the "relief" to be given by the deduction.
In general, the resultant matching of cash payment and deduction seems
appropriate. The capital expenditure must be for the primary purpose of
medical care: for example, when the primary purpose of the expenditure
is to help the patient commute to and from work, an expense normally
regarded as personal, the cases and rulings consistently have denied the
will commuting
deduction. 5 ' Only when the work itself is therapeutic
52
expenses be deductible as medical expenses.1
Capital improvements susceptible to greatest possible abuse are those
made to property which might serve nonmedical purposes, like those
attached to a residence. The regulations now allow a deduction in the full
1 53
amount of the excess of cost over increased value to other property.
Not all legal fees expended for "medical" reasons are nondeductible. When a patient
refused to accept therapy for a mental disorder, the legal fees expended to establish a
guardianship as a prerequisite to treatment were deductible. Gerstacker v. Commissioner,
414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969); Rev. Rul. 71-281, 1971-2 C.B. 165.
146 Rev. Rul. 75-319, 1975-2 C.B. 88.
Rev. Rul. 75-187, 1975-1 C.B. 92 (cost of treatment was held deductible but costs of
'
lodging at a nearby hotel were held nondeductible).
148 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-I(e)(1)(iii) (1974). See Riach v. Frank, 302 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1962).
1 Rev. Rul. 67-76, 1967-1 C.B. 70 (permitting the taxpayer to deduct the item's maintenance and operating costs as well); Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, 308.
150 Rev. Rul. 70-606, 1970-2 C.B. 66. See Private Rul. 77-30,014 (1977).
"5 Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959); Ann Coopersmith, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1203 (1971); Rev. Rul. 66-80, 1966-1 C.B. 57.
112 Misfeldt v. Kelm, 52-2 U.S. Tax Cas. $ 9495 (D. Minn. 1952); Sanford H. Weinzimer,
17 T.C.M. (CCH) 712 (1958).
'"
For example, a taxpayer with a coronary condition may deduct the cost of installing an
elevator in his home, less the increase in value to the house. This approach represents a
change from that of regulations first promulgated under the 1954 Code, which permitted a
deduction only for capital items not attached to the property and allowed no deduction if the
improvement enhanced the value of other property. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii), T.D.
6279, 1957-2 C.B. 190. The Service litigated this position with little success outside the Tax
Court. In Hollander v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1955), the Third Circuit
reversed the Tax Court and permitted a deduction for a stair elevator. The taxpayer, who
had suffered a coronary thrombosis, had no bath or bedroom on the first floor of her home.
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Additionally, the taxpayer must show that the primary purpose for the
expenditure was medical. The more common a capital item, however, the
harder it becomes for a taxpayer to establish a medical purpose in contrast to a normal living motivation. In some cases, taxpayers deducted the
cost of installing air conditioning. When the taxpayers established a need
based on allergic reaction to dust, cardiac condition, or special respiratory
condition, the deduction was allowed, but not otherwise.15 4 Other exam155
ples of improvements sometimes permitted include swimming pools
156
and special plumbing fixtures.
The problem that an expenditure may provide a mixture of personal
gratification and medical treatment is aggravated as to capital improvements because of the large amount that may be deducted in a single
year. 157 The three percent of AGI limitation is unlikely to eliminate this
problem, as it frequently does with small expense items of dubious character. The limitation contained in the regulations-that enhancement in
value of the taxpayer's property be subtracted in computing the medical
Although the Tax Court had found that the purpose of the improvement was to prevent her
from doing any further damage to her heart, it denied the deduction because of the
inclinator's capital nature. For similar rulings, see Berry v. Wiseman, 174 F. Supp. 748 (W.D.
Okla. 1958); Post v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ala. 1956); Snellings v. United
States, 149 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Va. 1956); Alexander v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9335 (W.D. Tenn. 1956); cf. Estate of Hayne, 22 T.C. 113 (1954) (cost of installing elevator
for stroke victim not deductible even though elevator did not increase value of property).
But see Rev. Rul. 59-411, 1959-2 C.B. 100 (allowing deduction for permanent capital improvement to extent that it does not increase value of other property). In Riach v. Frank,
302 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1962), the taxpayer installed a "Hil-A-Vator" on his residential
property to transport him up and down a steep hillside separating the street level and the
shore of Lake Washington. His heart condition prevented him from using the lower two
thirds of his property without this device. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that in
the prior cases the improvement was installed for essential living functions, finding it
reasonable for the taxpayer to expect to go from one part of his property to another.
Because the Hil-A-Vator was installed primarily for mitigation and prevention of disease, it
was a medical expense. The court rejected the government's stance against deduction of
capital item expenditures, but it held that any enhancement in value was in the nature of
"compensation" for the expenditure and nondeductible. The excess over the enhancement
could be deducted in full. Shortly after the decision in Riach, the present regulation,
reaching similar results, was made final. T.D. 6604 (1962).
1"4 Raymon Gerard, 37 T.C. 826 (1962), acq. 1966-2 C.B. 5. But see Wallace v. United
States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971); Wade v. United States, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9709 (D.
Ariz. 1961); Rev. Rul. 76-80, 1976-1 C.B. 71 (vacuum cleaner not deductible). In John L.
Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950), the taxpayer was barred from deducting the cost of installing
an oil furnace to ease an allergy to coal dust and ashes. See Frank S. Delp, 30 T.C. 1230
(1958).
"I Mason v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
10,012 (D. Hawaii 1957) (hydrotherapy
prescribed for polio victim). But see Rev. Rul. 54-57, 1954-1 C.B. 67 (general health improvement).
'" Rev. Rul. 70-395, 1970-2 C.B. 65 (handicapped person). The cost of a special device to
add fluoride to home drinking water is deductible when installed on a dentist's advice, Rev.
Rul. 64-267, 1964-2 C.B. 69, but the cost of distilled water, purchased without medical
advice, to avoid drinking fluoridated water, is not. Rev. Rul. 56-19, 1956-1 C.B. 135.
151 For years prior to 1967, the statute imposed a maximum dollar limit on the medical
expense deduction. For 1966 the limit was $5000 per exemption claimed on the return, but
in no event more than $10,000 for a single individual and $20,000 for a joint return. I.R.C. §
213(c) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 106(d)(1), 79 Stat. 336 (1965)).
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expense-doubtless serves to minimize abuse. However, people who do not
have medical problems also frequently pay more for an improvement
than the resultant increase in value to the property, and this element of
essentially personal expenditure is beyond the reach of the regulation. In
addition, a danger exists that the capital improvement, although currently
intended primarily for a medical purpose, in fact will be used for recreational or other nonmedical purposes in the future. Ordinarily, when a
capital item is purchased for business use, we need not consider the
future uses of the property: determinations concerning the deductions
attributable to the property are made on a year-by-year basis. By contrast,
the determination for medical expenses must be made in the first year.
Although the availability of the improvement for future nonmedical use is
accounted for to some extent by subtracting the enhancement in value to
the property, this adjustment cannot take all such use into consideration.
Finally, as noted earlier, the taxpayer normally has no tax duty to mitigate
expenses of medical care.
These problems are well illustrated in Collins H. Ferris.158 Because the
taxpayer's wife was required to swim twice daily to remedy a painful
spinal condition, the Ferris family built a swimming pool in their home.
Of a total cost of $194,000, they spent $22,500 for special touches, such as
a sauna and ceramic tile surrounding the pool. The taxpayer claimed a
deduction of $86,000, after subtracting what he estimated to be the
increased value to the house.1 59 While the Service conceded the appropriateness of a swimming pool as medical care in this case, it contended that
a pool suitable for the wife's needs could have been built for $70,000,
resulting in deductible medical expenses of $39,000.160 The taxpayer's
extra cost should be disallowed as personal, the Commissioner argued,
because it was incurred chiefly to cause the pool to conform with the
architecture of the house. The .Tax Court, however, allowed most of the
deduction. Having determined that the primary purpose of the pool's
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 765 (1977).
159The taxpayer computedthe deduction as follows:
[figures rounded
to nearest $100]
158

$177,000
cost of construction
17,700
architect/engineer's fees
$194,700
pool cost
(22,500)
(nonessentials)
$172,200
medical care portion
(86,200)
(increase in value to house)
TT61W
deductible medical expense
160 The Service's computation of the deduction based on the more modest swimming pool
is as follows:
pool cost
(increase in value to house)
deductible medical expense

$70,000
(31,000)
$39,000
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construction was medical, it held that the full amount of the expenditure,
less only improvement value, qualifies for deduction. Just as he has no
obligation to choose the least expensive medical services, the taxpayer may
buy a better-than-minimum capital item. Any enhancement in property
value must be subtracted from the expenditure, which, in the court's view,
adequately protects the general revenue. Thus, if the taxpayer had installed the pool represented by the Commissioner's bare-bones figure,
adjusted for expenditures previously omitted, he would have spent
$80,000. According to expert testimony, the value of the house would not
have been enhanced at all by such a pool, so the full amount would have
been a medical expense. On the basis of the taxpayer's approach, and
after relatively small adjustments, the amount actually permitted as a
deduction was $82,000.161
The latter point hardly establishes that the revenue is adequately protected by the Tax Court's approach, resting as it does on findings based
on appraisal evidence regarding both the value actually added to the
house and the value that might have been added by a hypothetical pool
not built. Even the difference of $2,000 on the court's calculation arguably represents a degree of personal enjoyment that section 213 was not
intended to subsidize. Moreover, as with any capital investment, the taxpayer may use borrowed money for the expenditure.1 6 2 This use of
leverage permits, as elsewhere, a large deduction for a small current cash
expenditure: the medical deduction tax shelter. The timing advantage not
only confers the usual benefits of tax deferral, but also reduces the
adverse impact of the three percent floor: this limitation applies only
once, in the year of purchase, rather than in each year the medical
benefits are enjoyed or the debt payments are made. Thus, taxpayers in
higher brackets happily bunch payments in a single year.
A similar danger to the revenue arises from any effort to bunch medical
expense payments or otherwise to shift the year in which the deduction
may be claimed. In. requiring that the expense be "paid" during the
taxable year, the statute seems to permit some shifting when the expenses
are incurred in another year. However, in Robert S. Bassett,1 6 3 the Tax
Court denied a deduction in an earlier year for a taxpayer's prepayment
of the cost of hospital services to be rendered in a later year. The court
found the payment to be a deposit against expenses yet to be incurred
rather than a payment for an expense already giving rise to an obligation
to pay. But a nonrefundable advance payment by the taxpayers to an
institution, to assure acceptance of their handicapped daughter for
lifetime care upon their deaths or other inability to care for her, was ruled
'6 This medical expense
reported cases. See note 157
162 A taxpayer conceivably
ity of securing the loan with
asset.
163 26 T.C. 619 (1956).

is the largest I have found for a single capital item in the
supra.
might finance any medical care by borrowing, but the possibilthe purchase arises only when the expenditure buys a capital

1978]

MEDICAL EXPENSE TAX DEDUCTION

by the Service to be a medical expense in the year of payment. 16 4 As with
the capital expenditure, the Service appears willing, provided that the
obligation has been incurred, to permit some bunching of payments in
order to avoid the recordkeeping and other complications of spreading
the tax effects over several years.1 "'
VII.

OLD AGE

Aging frequently brings its own special wrinkles to the medical expense
problem. One often litigated question concerns whether a taxpayer may
claim deductions for health care expenses of an elderly parent or other
relation. The taxpayer may do so if the patient is a dependent of the
taxpayer-a person bearing a stated relationship to the taxpayer and
having more than half of his support provided by the taxpayer during the
taxable year. 1 66 Litigation usually focuses upon the support test. The tax
and the Code itself provides
concept of "support" is not well defined,'
little elucidation. Moreover, when there are competing sources of funding
to provide support-as when the elderly person has some of his own
income, or other siblings of the taxpayer provide funds-the determination whether one particular taxpayer provided more than half the support may be difficult. The statute now provides some guidance on the
latter question by permitting two or more taxpayers who together contribute over half the support to determine by agreement which of them
will claim the deduction.1 6 In this manner, taxpayers obtain certainty in
planning, and the Commissioner does not risk two taxpayers claiming the
same individual as a dependent.
If a taxpayer incurs significant expenses for an elderly parent's medical
care; deductibility of the expense may be a considerable benefit, far
exceeding in importance the additional personal exemption. But the expansion of public programs of support for the needy, as well as private
and public medical insurance programs, may push the taxpayer's percentage of support of his parent to less than half if these other sources are
164 Rev. Rul. 75-303, 1975-2 C.B. 87; Rev. Rul. 75-302, 1975-2 C.B. 86.

165 A useful comparison is Rev. Rul. 58-303, 1958-1 C.B. 61, in which, as a condition of
his father's admittance, a son paid to a religious institution operating a nursing home a lump
sum amount equal to one year's maintenance multiplied by the father's life expectancy. In
determining whether the son provided over half the father's support, so as to render the
father a dependent under section 152, the Service required the payment to be amortized
over the father's life.
106 I.R.C. § 152(a). The taxpayer may claim an additional personal exemption for a
dependent parent only if the latter earned less than $750 of gross income in the year. I.R.C.
§ 151(e). The gross income requirement does not carry over to the medical expense
deduction.
167 See Comment, Turecamo v. Commissioner: Treatment of Benefits Received Under the
Medicare Program for Purposes of the Dependency Exemption Support Test, 126 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 673 (1978). See also I.R.C. § 677(b); Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212; Rev. Rul.
56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23.
168 I.R.C. § 152(c). Similar rules permit divorced or separated parents to allocate dependent status. See I.R.C. § 152(e).
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taken into account. In Turecamo v. Commissioner,169 the taxpayers provided
food, lodging, clothing and entertainment for Mrs. Turecamo's mother,
Mrs. Kavanaugh. During the year in question, Mrs. Kavanaugh was hospitalized for two months. Her total bill amounted to $11,096, $10,435 of
which was paid by basic Medicare benefits (part A benefits).1 70 The taxpayers paid the balance and other medical expenses, which amounted to
$3531. They deducted this amount and also claimed a personal exemption for Mrs. Kavanaugh as a dependent. The Commissioner disallowed
these deductions, arguing that the part A benefits constituted part of Mrs.
Kavanaugh's support for that year and that the taxpayers had therefore
provided less than half her support. The Tax Court and the Second
Circuit held for the taxpayers.
Both courts were faced with two lines of decision that converged in
Turecamo. The Tax Court had held that welfare payments and other
benefits of a social welfare nature, although excluded from the recipient's
gross income, counted as support provided by the recipient for himself.1 7 1
The Service had ruled that part A basic Medicare benefits were of this
character and must be included in the support computation as having
been provided by the recipient.1 7 2 On the other hand, health insurance
had been consistently counted toward support when premium payments
were made but not when the insurance company paid out proceeds.1 73
Given this background, the Service ruled that supplementary Medicare
benefits (part B benefits) counted toward support when the premiums
were paid, but the part B benefits themselves should be excluded from
support.1 74 Both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit rejected the public
welfare benefits argument and instead analogized part A payments to
insurance. In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit found it persuasive that the program spread risks among the class of beneficiaries.
Moreover, the court concluded that large, random payments should not
be allowed to distort the relationship between the Turecamos and Mrs.
Kavanaugh; the Turecamo result also facilitates planning with a view to tax
75
consequences. 1
Once the taxpayer establishes the dependency relationship, he still must
show that the expense is for medical care. Sometimes the care is provided
at home. The expense of a companion or housemaid is deemed purely
169 554 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g 64 T.C. 720 (1975).
170 See Social Security Act, subch. XVIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 9 5 -1395pp (Supp. V 1975).
171

Helen M. Lutter, 61 T.C. 685 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975); Eddie L. Carter, 55 T.C. 109 (1970), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 2; Rev. Rul.
71-468, 1971-2 C.B. 115.
172 Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31, 32.
'73 Mawhinney v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam), aff'g 43 T.C.
443 (1965); Rev. Rul. 64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50. But see Samples v. United States, 226 F. Supp.
115 (N.D. Ga. 1963) (medical bills covered by insurance are still includable in computation to
determine whether taxpayer supports brother).
174 Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31, 32.
175 There is no risk under the Turecamo result that the Treasury might be whipsawed by
duplicative dependency claims, because only one taxpayer will be able to claim that he
provided more than half the support under the court's computation.
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personal, 17 6 while expenses for nursing care, including board, are treated
as medical expenses. 177 In a few instances, the Tax Court has allowed a
deduction even when the person who provides the care is a relative of the
178
taxpayer.
Nursing home care presents further definitional problems. Nursing
homes often provide food, lodging and other benefits normally treated as
nondeductible personal expenses. The regulations call for a factual determination of whether and to what extent care in such an institution
should be treated as a medical expense. 179 If the availability of medical
care in the institution is a principal reason for the individual's presence
there, all costs incidental to providing such care, including meals and
lodging, are deductible; if the individual's condition is such that the
availability of medical care is not a principal reason for his presence in the
institution, only that portion of the cost directly attributable to nursing or
other conventional medical treatment qualifies for a deduction. Medical
care need only be one of the "principal" reasons. In W.B. Counts,' 80 the
Commissioner sought to disallow the cost of placing the taxpayer's father
in a nursing home after the mother had been admitted to recover from a
stroke, on the ground that the father's presence was motivated by a desire
to be near his wife. The taxpayer successfully defended the deduction by
showing that the father's condition confined him to bed and required
nurse supervision. But in John Robinson,'I the taxpayer was unable to live
alone and care for himself. The principal reason for residing at the
nursing home was to preserve his general dignity in his remaining years.
The Tax Court held this insufficient to warrant a medical deduction.
Even if the cost of the nursing home is not fully deductible as a medical
expense, the specific portion allocable to medical care may be claimed.
The taxpayer, however, has the burden of showing what part of the
general fee is attributable to this expense."" The same rule applies to
payment of a lump sum fee to the retirement home: the expenditure is
deductible if the home provides a separate statement which, based on
prior experience, allocates a portion of the fee to provision of medical
1
care. 83
In some instances, taxpayers have successfully claimed charitable con"I8 See Rev. Rul. 58-339, 1958-2 C.B. 106 (portion of housemaid's salary attributable to
nursing care may be deducted). Note that, if the expenses are necessary to enable the
taxpayer to be gainfully employed, they may be taken as a credit under section 44A if the
parent is incapable of caring for himself.
'77 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957).
178 Walter D. Bye, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 238 (1972) (niece); Estate of Myrtle P. Dodge, 20
T.C.M. (CCH) 1811 (1961) (daughter).
179 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(l)(v) (1957). Compare the treatment of special schools, discussed at text accompanying note 51 supia.
"0 42 T.C. 755 (1964).
181 51 T.C. 520 (1968).
182 See James J. Matles, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1489 (1964); Rev. Rul. 67-185, 1967-1 C.B. 70.
183 Rev. Rul. 75-302, 1975-2 C.B. 87. But see Rev. Rul. 68-525, 1968-2 C.B. 112 (portion of
fee allocable to construction of an infirmary is not deductible, because such construction is
not medical expense of taxpayer).
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tribution deductions for lump sum payments to nursing homes in which
the taxpayers or their relatives will live. In such situations the home is an
exempt charity, and the relevant question becomes whether the payment
was made in exchange for the home's promise to support the elderly
person, barring a deduction, or was a gift, proceeding out of "disinterested generosity."' 1 4 The Eighth Circuit allowed such a deduction
when the payment was an unconditional endowment gift without any
promise of lifetime care; it reversed as clearly erroneous a finding by the
Tax Court that the motive for the gift was admission to the home and
receipt of other benefits. 18 5 But, more recently, the Seventh Circuit held
nondeductible the payments made by a son under a founder's gift plan,
on the ground that the payment was to gain admittance for the taxpayer's
mother.1 8 6 Similarly, when a charity requests a gift from an applicant
based on the nature of the accommodations applied for, the Service will
consider the payment nondeductible as a charitable contribution." 7

VIII.

DEATH

Medical expenses incurred for a decedent but paid out of his estate may
be deducted as if the expense had been paid by the decedent when
incurred. This special treatment accorded by section 213(d) is doubly
conditioned: the payment must be made by the estate within a one-year
period, and the estate must waive any claim to deduct the expenses for
estate tax purposes as administration expenses. Survivors thus may determine whether an income tax deduction or an estate tax deduction is
more beneficial.' 88
All definitional problems concerning whether an expense is "for the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body,"'8 a end, quite
reasonably, upon death. Therefore, all attempts to deduct burial or
gravestone costs have been, 90 and should continue to be, rejected by the
courts.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The difficult medical expense deduction cases have implicated three
often conflicting goals. First, no deduction of personal expenditures in the
184 Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (defining gift for purposes of
I.R.C. § 102) (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
"I Wardwell's Estate v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962); cf. Dowell v. United
States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977) (connection between taxpayer's "sponsorship gift" to
retirement home and later receipt of residential benefits from home was not so strong as to
bar deductibility of gift under I.R.C. § 170).
18 Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g 74-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9442
(S.D. Ind. 1974). See Rev. Rul. 58-303, 1958-1 C.B. 61.
187 Rev. Rul. 72-506, 1972-2 C.B. 106.
188 See Rev. Rul. 77-357, 1977-40 I.R.B. 16.
189 I.R.C. § 213(e)(1)(A).
190 Estate of Carolyn W. Libby, 14 T.C.M (CCH) 699 (1955).
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guise of health care should be permitted. Second, the system should
operate with relative neutrality and should not favor some kinds of health
care over others. Third, the medical deduction should entail a minimum
of recordkeeping and accounting. The cases and rulings establish a clear
middle ground between these sets of claims. The Tax Court's "but for"
test, which looks to the nature of the medical exigency and the additional
expenditures it requires, provides a useful way to distinguish 'personal
from medical expenses. Similarly, the Service's rule as to capital expenditures does rough justice in allowing some deduction for an expenditure
that is occasioned by health care needs but also has personal enjoyment or
enhancement of value aspects. Unusual medical care comes within the
deduction when validated in some way beyond personal idiosyncracy. In
general, these rules tend to favor administrability over undue nicety in
scrutinizing the personal and the medical components of a situation.
Thus, for example, they do not require mitigation of expenses. Courts
and the Service have not refined the deduction by allocating between
pleasure and health care elements within a particular expenditure.
These results have their costs. One cost is to discriminate against the
deductibility of care arising in an everyday setting rather than an institutional one, as illustrated by the cases involving special schools for children
with mental or emotional problems. The increased emphasis within the
medical profession on preventive medicine may subject this policy to new
scrutiny. Another cost is to allow deduction for items that include some
clear elements of personal nonmedical enjoyment, without allocating between the different elements. This problem is exemplified in the capital
improvement rules. The Service and the courts have tended to tolerate
these costs in order to administer the deduction without elaborate recordkeeping or evidentiary requirements. In the main, a workable balance
has been struck.
This does not suggest, however, that the tax definition of medical
expenditure need not be reviewed with a critical legislative eye. I noted at
the outset that it was possible to characterize the deduction as either an
appropriate adjustment to the income tax or an indirect subsidy to alleviate the cost of medical care. In analyzing administration of the deduction, a choice between these views was unnecessary because case law
resolution of difficult cases was the same under both. But in making
legislative choices, the subsidy view provides us with a perspective for
possible changes in the statute. For example, it implicitly directs us to
compare other federal subsidy systems for health care. Such a comparison
discloses that the medical expense deduction provides support for many
expenditures not treated as reimbursable medical expenses by other subsidy arrangements.' 91 These expenditures are especially suspect because
191 The Administration's proposal to change the percentage of AGI subtracted in computing the deduction, see note 3 supra, would not directly address this kind of problem.
However, H.R. 12078, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), would alter the medical care definition
contained in I.R.C. § 213(e)(1) by adding the following phrase to subparagraph (A): "but
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they involve significant personal enjoyment attributes. Private schools,
travel to another city to visit a particular physician, unusual foods, a
companion on trips and a swimming pool may be deducted-and hence
partly supported by tax funds-if sufficiently related to medical need.
They are not reimbursed or subsidized in direct assistance programs.
Indeed, the frontier issues for those subsidy programs are more basic
than those litigated under the medical deduction. Medicaid recipients
recently litigated their entitlement to a dilation and curettage or reimbursement for eyeglasses. 192 To the extent that characterization of the tax
deduction as a subsidy reminds us of these differences, it may be useful in
shaping statutory changes.
only if such amounts are paid for property or services of a type normally used primarily for
such a purpose." This limitation, which apparently is intended to reverse the result in Collins
H. Ferris, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 765 (1977); see text accompanying note 158 supra, would cast
doubt upon the deductibility of many expenses now treated as medical care, particularly
those under the "but for" rule. Examples are education expenses, see C. Fink Fischer, 50
T.C. 164 (1968), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxiv; text accompanying note 61 supra, special diets, see text
accompanying note 73 supra, and travel accompaniment, see Rev. Rul. 75-317, 1975-2 C.B.
57; text accompanying note 121 supra. The Ferris problem can be addressed more narrowly,
as by requiring capitalization and depreciation for large capital expenditures.
112 Medical Society of the State of New York v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1977); White
v. Beale, 555 F.2d 1146 (5d Cir. 1977).

